We provide a characterization of when an action is rationalizable in a binary action coordination game in terms of beliefs and higher order beliefs. The characterization sheds light on when a global game yields a unique outcome. In particular, we can separate those features of the noisy information approach to global games that are important for uniqueness from those that are merely incidental. We derive two su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness that do not make any reference to the relative precision of public and private signals.
Introduction
Games often have many equilibria. Even when they have a single equilibrium, they often have many actions that are rationalizable, and are therefore consistent with common knowledge of rationality. Yet a pathbreaking paper by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) suggested a natural perturbation of complete information that gives rise to a unique rationalizable equilibrium for each player. They introduced the idea of "global games" -where any payo¤s of the game are possible and each player observes the true payo¤s of the game with a small amount of noise. They showed -for the case of two player two action games -that as the noise about payo¤s become small, there is a unique equilibrium; the equilibrium strategies played also constitute the unique rationalizable strategies. This result has since been generalized in a number of directions and used in a number of applications. 1 When the global game approach can be applied to more general games, it can be used to derive unique predictions in settings where the underlying complete information game has multiple equilibria, making it possible to carry out comparative static and policy analysis.
However, a number of recent papers have raised questions both on the basic theoretical rationale for global games and the applicability of the framework for the analysis of real world problems. Three strands of the argument from the literature are particularly worthy of note. 3. While common knowledge of payo¤s is relaxed in global games, there is still assumed to be common knowledge of the information structure, which is surely a no more realistic assumption. A recent paper by
Weinstein andYildiz (2007) shows that the exact form of the perturbation away from common knowledge of payo¤s is crucial in determining the rationalizable outcome. The global game prediction is not the only possible perturbation that yields unique rationalizable outcomes.
What claim does the global game approach have for being a "natural"
or "reasonable"perturbation?
The objective of our paper is to evaluate these arguments and questions concerning the global game methodology, and to provide a framework that can both deepen our understanding of the theoretical basis for global games and to provide guidance for applied researchers on the scope (and limitations)
of the global game approach.
The canonical information structure associated with the global game approach is one where players observe the underlying fundamental variable with some noise. This is for the historical reason that the early papers (Carlsson and van Damme (1993) , Morris and Shin (1998)) adopted this formalism.
The noise is a convenient way to relax common knowledge of the fundamentals, but in subsequent applications of global games the noisy information structure has been taken more literally -as players failing (literally) to observe the true fundamentals perfectly. Many of the criticisms of the global game approach presumes such a literal interpretation of the global games approach.
However, there are pitfalls in taking the noisy information structure too literally, as the underlying logic of the argument becomes identi…ed with a particular formalism, and the general scope of the approach becomes obscured by debates surrounding the merits or otherwise of the particular formalism. The logic underlying the global game approach turns out to be more robust, and is not tied to taking noisy signals literally.
In this paper, we revisit the belief foundations of global games. We know already that the failure of common knowledge of the fundamentals is a necessary condition for generating the global game outcome, but the more demanding task is to show precisely how beliefs depart from the complete information benchmark. We have two objectives in this paper.
First, we link the global game analysis with the earlier literature on common knowledge and interactive epistemology -to the framework popularized by Aumann (1976) and Monderer and Samet (1989) . We provide a frame-work that can encompass global games (especially their countable state analogues) within a framework of interactive beliefs. We de…ne an operator on the type space that has a strong resemblance to the p-belief operator of Monderer and Samet (1989) , and show how rationalizability corresponds to common belief in this generalized belief operator. The perspective is that of an outside observer who observes only whether a player chooses one action or the other. The fact that a particular action has been chosen reveals much about the player's beliefs -both about the fundamentals of the environment, but also about the beliefs and higher order beliefs of other players. The belief operators that we identify correspond with to the revealed strength of beliefs that a player holds about the environment and the other players. In this sense, we take the viewpoint of an outside observer (such as an empirical economist) who attempts to piece together the beliefs from the action chosen.
In this way, we can characterize the higher order beliefs that underpin play in global games, thereby answering the question of how the departure from common knowledge is achieved in global games.
Second, the revealed beliefs approach yields insights on the question of when there is a unique rationalizable outcome in the global game. By using the framework of the generalized belief operators, we identify two sets of su¢ cient conditions on the common beliefs of the types that ensure unique rationalizability. Essentially, the property that matters is the stationarity of beliefs with respect to the ordering of types. Global game arguments work because the beliefs that player types have over their neighboring types do not change abruptly as we consider types along the ordering. A special case of such insensitivity of beliefs along the type space is the case when each type believes he is "typical". We show that uniqueness in the noisy information approach to global games with public and private information uses precisely this strong version of insensitivity of beliefs to the order.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin in section 2 with a leading example that illustrates many of the features that will make an appearance in the general argument. We then characterize the higher order beliefs that are necessary and su¢ cient for rationalizability, and revisit some familiar examples of global games from the applied literature, and illustrate our result. Section 5 then builds on earlier results to shed light on uniqueness.
We discuss two su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness that do not make reference to noisy signals, or relative precisions of private and public signals.
Example
There are I players who choose from finvest, not investg. There is a cost of investing, p 2 (0; 1). The payo¤ to investing depends on the fundamental state . There are dominance thresholds and with < such that "not invest"is dominant when falls below the lower threshold and "invest"is dominant when is above the upper threshold . When < , the gross return to investing is zero irrespective of the actions of the other players, so that investing yields a sure payo¤ of p. When > , the gross return to investing is 1 irrespective of the actions of the other players so that investing yields a sure payo¤ of 1 p.
When , the gross return to investing is 1 if and only if proportion q or more of the players (including oneself) invest, where 0 < q < 1. The payo¤ matrix is at least q invest less than q invest invest 1 p p not invest 0 0
Reconstructing the Belief Hierarchy
For an outside observer (an empirical economist, say), the observable features of the problem are quite coarse. The outside observer sees only whether a player invests or not. But when combined with the knowledge of the payo¤s and the players'rationality, the decision to invest reveals much about that player's beliefs -both about the fundamentals , but also about the beliefs of other players.
Suppose player i is seen to invest. Then, either i has a dominant action to invest, or he p-believes all of the following. there is probability less than p that proportion q or more players consider "invest" as being …rst-order undominated. Then, fewer than q will invest.
In general, the failue to p-believe statement n + 1 is a reason not to invest, because there is probability less than p that proportion q or more players consider "invest"as being n-th order undominated.
In this way, unless i …nds it dominant to invest, p-belief of all the statements in the list is necessary for "invest" to be chosen. Conversely, when a player p-believes all of the statements in the list, this is also su¢ cient for "invest"to survive the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.
There is an exactly analogous hierarchy of beliefs that are revealed by a player who chooses not to invest. 
Information Structure
To explore when one or other action may be supported as an iteratively undominated action, we introduce an information structure. Suppose takes realizations in the set of integers Z = f ; 2 1; 0; 1; 2; 3; g and there is a prior density over Z. There are I = 2n + 1 players who play the investment game.
The players receive noisy signals concerning . Let s i be player i's signal realization. s i takes values in Z. Conditional on , player i is equally likely to observe any signal between n to + n, but we depart from the familiar global game assumption that players'signals are independent conditional on . The purpose of this departure is to construct an information structure that is as close as possible in spirit to the continuum player global game, as we will elaborate below. Conditional on , each signal realization between n and + n is observed by precisely one player. No two players observe the same signal, and each possible realization between n and + n is observed by some player.
One way in which our information structure could be generated is through the following procedure. Conditional on , a player is selected randomly to receive the highest signal (namely + n). Each player has equal chance of being selected. Next, the second highest signal realization, + n 1 is given to a player chosen from the remaining pool of players, where each player has equal chance of being selected, and so on. Once the ranking has been chosen (unknown to the players themselves), each player observes his signal, and makes inferences based on this signal. The information structure arrived at in this way has the following two features.
Any two players can be strictly ranked according to their signal realizations.
Conditional on , player i has equal chance of observing any signal realization between n and + n.
Conditional on observing signal realization s i , player i's posterior density has support over the interval [s i n; s i + n], and
for , 0 in the support. Among other things, this means that the posterior densities can be ranked by …rst-degree stochastic dominance.
We can trace a player's beliefs about his rank in the population, as measured by the realization of his signal relative to those of others. Player i with signal s i has the highest signal realization when = s i n. So, player i believes he has the highest signal with probability (s i n j s i ). In general, player i with signal s i believes that he has the k + 1-th highest signal in the population with probability (s i n + k j s i ). Let k (s i ) be the probability that player i assigns to there being k 1 players with signals lower than himself, conditional on signal
be the pro…le of i's beliefs over his rank order, conditional on s i .
Evident Events
For the next step, see …gure 1. Fix^ , and letŝ be the highest signal realization such that proportion q or more of players have signal realizations that areŝ or higher at^ . Denote byp the probability that ^ conditional onŝ. We then have:
1. When ^ , proportion q or more players receive signalŝ or higher.
This follows from the …rst-degree stochastic dominance of signal realizations as increases. where we keep track of the proportion q of players who p-believe an event.
Suppose now that^ , and that player ip-believes 
Uniqueness
Consider the rank pro…les (s i ) and (s 
Let s and s be signal realizations illustrated in …gure 2. s is the highest signal such that at , proportion q or more have signal s or higher. s is the lowest signal such that at , 1 q or more have signal s or lower.
We then have the following su¢ cient condition for uniqueness. Then, f j g is common (q; p)-belief at all , but f j g is not
both actions may be rationalizable, but this is due to the probability atom on arising from the fact that is drawn from a discrete space. Otherwise, there is a unique rationalizable outcome.
We note the following corollaries, bearing in mind that the results hold except possibly at one value of .
Corollary 3 If ( ) is a constant function over fs i j s s i sg, then there is a unique rationalizable outcome in the investment game.
For instance, ( ) would be constant over fs i j s s i sg if the prior is a geometric density over the relevant interval, so that ( ) = ( + 1) = ( + j) = ( + j + 1).
Also, although we have conducted the discussion with a common prior , our argument could easily be extended for the case where players hold di¤erent priors over . Izmalkov and Yildiz (2006) examine an information structure where some players are systematically more optimistic than others.
Our framework could accommodate such information structures.
An even more restrictive special case is when is not only constant over signals, but its cross-section is uniform over the possible rank orders, in the sense that
; ;
If (1) holds, player i believes he has equal probability of being ranked anywhere in the population. Player i believes that he is "typical" in quite a strong sense. The uniqueness result for continuum action global games with Gaussian fundamentals and signals rests of approaching the analogue of (1). When (s i ) is uniform, we can characterize the unique rationalizable outcome crisply.
"invest" is the unique rationalizable action in the …rst-order undominated region when p + q < 1. "Not invest" is the unique rationalizable action in the …rst-order undominated region when p + q > 1.
The corollary follows from the fact that when uniform,p = 1 q.
"Invest" is rationalizable whenp > p. That is, when p + q < 1. "Not Invest"is rationalizable when 1 p > 1 p. That is, when p + q > 1.
Comparison to Gaussian Information Structures
Given the importance of rank order beliefs, let us retrace what the analogous rank order beliefs are in the familiar Gaussian information structure that is commonly used in continuum player global games. Player i's private signal is given by
where is a Gaussian random variable with mean y and variance 1= , and " i is Gaussian with mean zero and variance 1= . The random variables f" i g are mutually independent, and independent of .
Denote by (x) the proportion of players whose signal is x or less. The " "stands for "lower". Then, (x) is a random variable with realizations in the unit interval, and which is a function of the random variables f ;
and the threshold x. We derive the density function of (x i ) conditional on
be the cumulative distribution function of (x i ) conditional on x i , evaluated at z. In other words,
so that, G (zjx i ) is the probability that the proportion of players with signal lower than x i is z or less, conditional on x i . Figure 4 illustrates the derivation
Given , the proportion of players who have signal below
where ( ) is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal.
Let^ be the realization of at which this proportion is exactly z. In other
The top panel of …gure 4 illustrates^ . When ^ , the proportion of players that have signal below x i is z or less. In other words,
The bottom panel of …gure 4 illustrates the argument. Conditional on x i , the density over is normal with mean
and precision + . The probability that ^ is the area under this density to the right of^ , namely
This expression gives G (zjx). Substituting out^ by using (5) and rearranging, we can re-write (7) to give:
In the special case when ! 1, the private signal becomes in…nitely precise.
In this limit,
so that G is the identity function. In other words, the c.d.f. of (x i ) is the 45 degree line, and hence the density over (x i ) is uniform. Thus, in this limit, player i believes that he is "typical" in quite a strong sense, in that he puts equal weight on every realization of (x i ). In this sense, the uniform density over is exactly analogous to the rank belief pro…le (:) being uniform.
Common Belief in Global Games
We now generalize our argument of the previous section. In so doing, we characterize the hierarchy of beliefs that underpin actions in global games.
We will also apply these insights in considering the hierarchy of beliefs that ensure a unique rationalizable outcome in the global game.
Setting
There are I players, I = f1; 2; :::; Ig and a countable set of payo¤ states, .
A type space is a collection T = (
, where T i is the set of types of player i and i :
). We consider binary action games, where each player i will choose a i 2 f0; 1g. We write i (Z; ) for the payo¤ gain is , the function i is de…ned as
Thus a game is parameterized by payo¤s =( 1 ; ::; I ). Throughout the paper, we will consider supermodular games which in this context means:
Product Events
The relevant state space for our problem is = T 1 T 2 ::: T I and an event would ordinarily be de…ned as a subset of . However, we will be interested in a special class of product events corresponding to each player i's type t i belonging to a subset F i T i . Thus a product event is a vector
We will be highlighting two interpretations of product events.
First, a product event F uniquely de…nes an equivalent ordinary event X F with X F = f(t 1 ; :::; t I ; ) 2 jt i 2 F i for each i = 1; :::; I g .
Where no confusion arises, we will identify a product event F with its equivalent ordinary event X F . In keeping with this interpretation, we will write t 2 F if t i 2 F i for each i = 1; :::; I and we will de…ne a natural partial order on product events by set inclusion, so F E if F i E i for each i = 1; ::; I.
Second, because we are focussing on binary action games, the set of product events is isomorphic to the set of strategy pro…les. Thus we can identify the product event F with the strategy pro…le where player i chooses action 1 if and only if t i 2 F i .
Denote by S the class of product events. Now S is a complete lattice under the partial order and the join E _ F and meet E^F of a pair of events E and F are de…ned as
We write for the smallest and largest elements of S, respectively.
Notice that the meet operation corresponds to intersection of the equivalent ordinary events, i.e.,
and that the (set inclusion) ordering on product events generates the same ordering as set inclusion on their equivalent ordinary events, i.e.,
F E if and only if
There is also a natural de…nition of the negation of an event, :F , with
Now the class of product events is closed under f_;^; :g. The de…nitions of join can be extended to any countable collection of simple events in the natural way, and we will appeal to these de…nitions later. Also, we note the following properties of these operations.
::F = F; :; = T; :T = ;
: (E _ F ) = :E \ :F
Generalized Belief Operators
We will de…ne player i's i -belief function B i i : S ! 2 T i as follows. Let Z F;i (t) be the set of players other than i such that t j 2 F j ; thus Z F;i : T ! 2 I is de…ned as Z F;i (t 1 ; ; t I ) = fj 2 I j j 6 = i and t j 2 F j g .
For any random variable f : T ! R, write E t i (f ) for type t i 's expectation of f , so
De…ne B (F ) as the product set:
B (F ) identi…es the set of type pro…les for whom playing 1 is a best reply when other players play 1 on event F ; equivalently, it is the set of types with high beliefs that F is true.
The generalized belief operator B : S ! S satis…es the following properties:
B4. B n (F ) is a decreasing sequence B1 states that B is an increasing operator on the lattice S; it is an implication of supermodularity, and shows that our interpretation of "revealed beliefs"is consistent with the deductive closure of beliefs. That is, if F implies F 0 , then belief in F implies belief in F 0 . B2 follows from the de…nition.
B3 is a continuity axiom: it is implied by B1 if the type space is …nite. In B4, B k denotes the k-fold application of the B operator. B4 follows from B1 and B2.
De…nition 5 Event F is -evident if it is a …xed point of B , i.e.,
By B2, this is equivalent to the requirement that F B (F ). Note that event F is -evident if and only if the strategy pro…le F is an equilibrium of the incomplete information game (where indi¤erent types choose action 1).
De…nition 6 Event C (F ) is the largest -evident contained in F , so (by B1)
If t 2 C (F ), we say that there is common -belief at t. At t, everyone -believes F , everyone -believes that everyone -believes F , and so on. . From property B1, we then have
Lemma 8 C (T ) is the largest -evident event, i.e., if F 0 is -evident then
This lemma shows that C (T ) is the equilibrium of the incomplete information game where action 1 is played the most. It is therefore a very special case of the observation of Vives (1990) that the largest equilibrium of a supermodular game can be found looking at the limit of best response dynamics starting at the largest strategy pro…le.
Characterizing Rationalizability
We now characterize rationalizable strategy pro…les in terms of our generalized belief operators, in the analogous way that we characterized rationalizable strategies in our leading example of the investment game. We …rst de…ne rationalizable actions as follows.
De…nition 9 Action a i is rationalizable for type t i if a i 2 R i ( ; t i ), where
This corresponds to the de…nition of "interim correlated rationalizability" in Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris [DFM] (2007), who gave a formal epistemic argument that the interim correlated rationalizable actions are exactly those that are consistent with common knowledge of rationality and a type's higher order beliefs about . They also show that there is the standard equivalence between (correlated) rationalizability and iterated dominance. An action is interim correlated rationalizable if and only if it survives iterated deletion of strictly interim dominated strategies (claim 1). The "correlation" in the de…nition arises because a player's type is allowed to have any -perhaps correlated -beliefs over others'actions, types and payo¤ states as long as he puts probability 1 on others'actions being rationalizable for their types (part (1) of the de…nition) and his beliefs are consistent with that type's beliefs about others types and payo¤ state. The alternative "interim independent rationalizability" solution concept discussed in DFM puts conditional independence restrictions on those beliefs. However, there will not be a di¤erence between the ex and interim solution concepts in this environment because supermodularity will ensure that the critical conditional beliefs over opponents' actions will be point beliefs.
Now we have our characterization of rationalizable actions.
Proposition 10 Action 1 is rationalizable for type t i if and only if t i 2 C i (T ).
Recall that a product event F can be understood as a strategy pro…le, where F i is the set of types of player i. The operator B is then the best response map on strategy pro…les. Now T corresponds to the largest strategy pro…le and C (T ) is the strategy pro…le that arises in the limit when we iteratively apply the best response function. Thus the above proposition re ‡ects the well known fact that best response dynamics starting with the largest strategy pro…le converges to the largest equilibrium in an incomplete information game with supermodular payo¤s (Vives (1990) ) and the largest equilibrium also correspondence to the largest rationalizable strategy pro…le (Milgrom and Roberts (1991) ). As noted above, the di¤erence between ex ante and interim rationalizability will not matter in this setting. For completeness, we will report a direct argument for the proposition which high-lights the "infection argument" logic from the higher order beliefs literature and introduces some techniques we will appear to later.
Proof. In proving this result, it is insightful to introduce a dual operator to the B operator. For any product event F , de…ne S (F ) as
To interpret S (F ), note that
is the set of player i's types for whom action 1 is a best reply when, for all j 6 = i, player j plays action 0 on
is the set of player i's types who strictly prefer to play action 0 when player j plays action 0 on F j , for all j 6 = i. Thus, S (F ) is the set of type pro…les who strictly prefer to play action 0 when action zero is played on F . Note that S (F ) is a simple event, when F is a simple event.
In particular, when F = ;, the event S (;) consists of the type pro…les for whom playing action 0 is strictly dominant. This is so, since the these types strictly prefer to play action 0 even if no other types play action 0.
The event S S (;)
consists of type pro…les who strictly prefer to play action 0 when all type pro…les in S (;) play action 0. In other words, S S (;) is the set of type pro…les who strictly prefer action 0 when faced with types who do not use …rst-order dominated actions. Iterating the S operator, the event
is the set of type pro…les who strictly prefer action 0 when faced with types who do not use kth order dominated actions. Then, the join de…ned as
is the simple event consisting of type pro…les who strictly prefer to play action 0 after the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. Thus, action 1 is rationalizable for player i if only if action 1 is a best reply when other types play action 1 in the negation of (10) . That is, action 1 is rationalizable for type t i player i if and only if
This proves the proposition.
Naturally, we can carry out an exactly analogous analysis for action 0.
De…ne e i be e i (Z; ) = i (I n (Z [ fig) ) .
Then we have
Proposition 11 Action 0 is rationalizable for type t i if and only if t i 2
Say that dominance solvability holds if R i ( ; t i ) = f0g or f1g for all i and t i .
Corollary 12
There is a unique rationalizable action for each type if and only if C (T ) = :C e (T ).
Characterizing Belief Hierarchies
We are now in a position to utilize our result on rationalizability to characterize the belief hierarchies of players in a global game. We take the point of view of an outside observer. We have just observed a player taking action We start with our leading example, discussed in an earlier section.
Investment Game Revisited
When , then successful coordination is possible only if proportion q or more invest. The cost of investing is p 2 (0; 1), and the gross return to investing is 1. The payo¤ to not investing is 0. In this case, we have
q and p, otherwise From our proposition on rationalizability, "invest" is rationalizable for a player if and only if the player p-believes all of the following 1.
2.
or proportion at least q p-believe that 0 3. or proportion at least q p-believe that [ or proportion at least q p-believes that 0]
4. and so on...
"Regime Change" Game
There is a cost of investing of p 2 (0; 1). The gross return to investing is 1 if proportion investing is at least f ( ), and it is 0 otherwise. The payo¤ to not investing is 0. These are the payo¤s in Morris and Shin's (1998) paper on currency attacks. The i function that corresponding to these payo¤s is given by 
Linear "Regime Change" Game
This is the special case of the regime change game where
Thus, the gross return to investing is 1 if proportion investing is at least 1 , and it is 0 otherwise. The payo¤ to not investing is 0. 
Linear Payo¤ Game
Payo¤ to invest is l, where l is the proportion of opponents not investing.
Payo¤ to not invest is 0. 1. player 1's expectation of is at least 0, i.e., E 1 ( ) 0 2. player 1's expectation of is at least one minus player 1's probability that player 2's expectation of is at least 0, i.e., E 1 ( )
3. player 1's expecation of is at least one minus player 1's probability that player 2's probability that player 1's expectation of is at least 0,
4. and so on ...
Contribution Game
The public good contribution game is a "private values" version of a global game. Let R I . The cost of investing is i . The return to investing is 0 if proportion at least invest, 1 otherwise.
In this context, invest is rationalizable for player 1 only if all of the following hold.
1. player 1's expectation of 1 is at least 0, e.g., E 1 ( 1 ) 0 2. player 1's expectation of 1 is at least one minus player 1's probability that the proportion of others with expectation of i at least 0 is at least .
3. and so on ...
Uniqueness
We now turn our attention to su¢ cient conditions for dominance solvability.
The perspective of common belief gives us new insights into the properties belief hierarchies that yield uniqueness. We report on two su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness. We begin with the common certainty of rank beliefs.
Common Certainty of Rank Beliefs
Common certainty of rank beliefs relies on a large degree of symmetry in the game, and has considerable a¢ nity with many uses of global games seen in the applied literature. The argument for uniqueness is a generalization of the argument we gave for the example of the investment game given in section 2.
Payo¤s are separable-symmetric if there exist a non-decreasing function g : f0; 1; ::; I 1g ! R and a function h : ! R such that
for all i = 1; ::; I, Z I=fig and 2 . We will maintain this assumption throughout this section. With separable-symmetric payo¤s, a type t i 2 T i has a strictly dominant strategy to choose action 1 if
and a type t i 2 T i has a strictly dominant strategy to choose action 0 if
Limit dominance is satis…ed if there exists at least one type of one player with a strictly dominant strategy to choose action 1 and at least one type of one player with a strictly dominant strategy to choose action 0. A type is said to be strategic if neither action is strictly dominant for that type.
We introduce the following complete order on the union of all types,
is the probability that player i attaches to there being exactly k 1 players'having a lower expectation of . De…ne
as the mapping that associates with each type the density over possible ranks for that player. Constant common rank beliefs of strategic types is satis…ed if there exists r 2 (f0; :::; I 1g) such that for each player i and each
Finally, we will use three "technical" assumptions. We label them technical assumptions because they satis…ed for free in the standard continuous signal global game environment with smooth densities. One merit of our discrete formulation is that it forces us to make explicit assumptions that are implicit in the standard formulation.
There is uniform separation if there exists " > 0 such that for any i and
In other words, if one type of a player has a higher expectation of than another, the di¤erence exceeds some uniform amount " . There are no rank ties if t i t j or t j t i for all i 6 = j. There are no common rank payo¤ ties
for all i and t i 2 T i .
Proposition 13
If separable-symmetric payo¤s, limit dominance, constant common rank beliefs of strategic types, uniform separation, no rank ties and no common rank payo¤ ties satis…ed, then dominance solvability holds. If r is the common rank belief held by all strategic types, action 1 is the unique rationalizable action for type t i of player i if
and action 0 is the unique rationalizable action of type t i of player i if
We can paraphrase our result as: Common certainty of common rank beliefs for strategic types implies dominance solvability, where "common certainty" denotes "common 1-belief," which is often described as common knowledge in the economics literature.
Proof. Limit dominance implies that there exists a player j and type t j such that
Now for each i,
Now we establish the following claim by induction on k: for each i and k = 0; 1; :::
where " is de…ned by the uniform separation assumption. Recall that
is the set of types of player i such that his unique kth level rationalizable action is to play 1. For k = 0, the claim follows from (11) and (12) . Suppose that the claim holds for k 1 and that t i 2 T i satis…es
If t i has a dominant strategy to play action 1, then t i 2 S to play action 1. So the expected payo¤ to playing action 1 is at least
. This establishes the inductive step. Now (13) implies 8 < :
A symmetric argument implies 8 < :
No payo¤ ties implies 8 < :
We brie ‡y report two simple weakenings of the common rank beliefs under which the result will continue to hold.
First, consider the …rst order stochastic dominance order on rank beliefs, so that r D r 0 if, for each n = 1; :::; I,
Say that there is decreasing common rank beliefs if, for any t i 2 T i and t j 2 T j ,
Now if we replaced the assumption of common and constant rank beliefs of strategic types with common and decreasing rank beliefs of strategic types, we would again have dominance solvability. In particular, action 1 (0) would be the unique rationalizable action if
Second, suppose that rank beliefs were not constant but that they did not change too fast relative to the expectations of fundamentals. Let
measure the strategic sensitivity of the game. Write (r; r 0 ) for the distance between the rank beliefs r and r 0 :
(r; r 0 ) = max
Say that there is near constant common rank beliefs if, for any t i 2 T i and 
Common Certainty of Beliefs in Di¤erences
We now present a second set of su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness that allows for asymmetry across players. Payo¤s are separable if there exist increasing functions
The type space of each player is two-dimensional. A type has two components. The …rst component is completely ordered and we identify it with the set of integers Z. The second component is any …nite set i . Thus, for each i, we have a bijection
The …rst component of a type can be interpreted as a signal received about the fundamentals , so that higher …rst components are associated with higher beliefs about . The second component is some other dimension along which players vary. However, note that the ordering applies only to the types of a single player, whereas the condition of common certainty of rank beliefs applied the ordering to the union of all types, and so we were ranking across players, also.
We now introduce our assumptions. Denote by g i1 (t i ) the …rst component of g i (t i ).
Assumption (Uniform Monotonicity): There exists " > 0 such that
Assumption (Limit Dominance): For each i, there exist t i and t i such that
Assumption ( -Di¤use Beliefs): There exists > 0 such that, for each i and, for each j 6 = i, h j : j ! Z,
The last assumption and the uniformity requirement in the …rst assumption can be thought of as technical assumptions: they are required only because we are allowing for discrete type spaces and are not required (or are implicit) in the standard continuous signals global games framework.
Finally, we come to our key de…nition. De…ne player i's beliefs about
To grasp the expression on the right hand side, note that g Proof. Figure 5 illustrates the argument. For each k = 0; 1; :::, there exists h 
and 0 2 R i ( ; t i ) if and only if
Now we prove uniqueness by …rst supposing that h i 6 = h i (and then proving a contradiction). Let c be the smallest integer such that
for all i and i 2 i . Observe that c > 0 and that there exists i and i 2 i satisfying h i ( i ) = h i ( i ) + c. Now observe that by (16), we know that
and thus 8 > > < > > :
Now suppose that player i is type g 1 i (h i ( i ) + c; i ) and believes this his opponents are choosing action 1 if and only if g j1 (t j ) h j (g j2 (t j ))+c. Then by common knowledge of beliefs in di¤erences
These are the payo¤s from the strategic part of the payo¤ function that depends on the actions of others. On the other hand, the part of the payo¤ function that depends on the fundamentals can be ordered by the assumption of monotonicity
so, adding the two parts of the payo¤ function together, we have 8 > > < > > :
and so 8 > > < > > :
For su¢ ciently small , the right hand side is strictly positive, contradicting our assumption that
This proof appeals to the "translation" argument of contradiction of 
Multidimensional Example
Global game applications have typically focussed on games that are symmetric across players with one dimensional signals. Here, we sketch a simple example that is asymmetric across players and allows for multiple dimensional signals. It thus illustrates how the logic of proposition 14 could be useful in applications. For simplicity, we simply present a continuous signals example. At some cost of tractability, we could discretize the example so that 14 applied.
Two players must decide whether to "invest" or "not invest". The cost of investing is either p or p, where 0 < p < p < 1. Player i is high cost with probability i . The return to investing is 1 if (i) > or (ii) if and the other player invests; otherwise the return to investing is 0. Let be uniformly distributed on the real line. Player i observes a signal x i = + " i ,
where each " i is independently distributed with full support density f . Thus 
2 H (x 1 x 2 ) + (1 2 ) H (x 1 x 2 ) p = c
1 H (x 2 x 1 ) + (1 1 ) H (x 2 x 1 ) p = c
1 H (x 2 x 1 ) + (1
Now observe that since h is symmetric by construction, H ( x) = 1 H (x).
Thus (19) and (20) 
